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Abstract—In this correspondence, we consider an amplify-and-
forward relay network in which relayed information is overheard
by an eavesdropper. In order to confound the eavesdropper,
a wireless-powered jammer is also considered which harvests
energy from a multiple-antenna source. We proposed a new
secure beamforming scheme in which beamforming vector is
a linear combination of the energy beamforming (EB) and
information beamforming (IB) vectors. We also present a new
closed-form solution for the proposed beamforming vector which
is shown to achieve a higher secrecy rate as compared to
the trivial EB and IB vectors. Moreover, a tight closed-form
approximation for the ergodic secrecy rate is also derived for the
asymptotic regime of a large number of antennas at the source.
Finally, numerical examples and simulations are provided which
validate our analytical results.
Index Terms—Amplify-and-forward, ergodic secrecy rate, se-
cure beamforming, wireless powered jammer.
I. INTRODUCTION
OWING to the benefits of the relaying architectures inincreasing the network coverage and/or its performance,
an overwhelming interest for wireless relay networks has been
exhibited by both industry and academia over the past decade
[1]. Relays play a critical role in establishing a communication
between the transmitter and the receiver particularly when a
direct link between these two nodes does not exist. However,
due to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium, in addition
to the legitimate receiver, relayed information can also be
overheard by a malicious eavesdropper.
In order to safeguard the confidential message from wire-
tapping, physical layer security (PLS) is considered as a
promising security mechanism which eliminates the drawbacks
of the conventional cryptographic techniques [2]. The ultimate
goal of PLS is to enhance the secrecy rate which is defined
as the rate difference between the legitimate channel and the
wiretap channel [3]. The significance of the secrecy rate lies
in the fact that secure communications (i.e., eavesdropper is
unable to decode a confidential message) is possible only when
this rate is positive.
To increase the secrecy rate, one of the most effective
approaches is to degrade the wiretap channel through con-
trolled artificial noise (AN), as proposed in [4]. Following the
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work of [4], several strategies have been devised for wireless
relay networks under the umbrella of cooperative jamming,
e.g., in [5]–[7] (see [8] for a comprehensive list of works
regarding cooperative jamming). In [5], Li et al. considered
multiple multi-antenna relays and eavesdroppers where each
relay participates in cooperative beamforming while emitting
AN. In [6], jamming power allocation strategies have been
investigated for an amplify-and-forward (AF) relay network
in which the destination transmits an intended jamming sig-
nal via relay to confuse an eavesdropper. New closed-form
expressions for the ergodic achievable secrecy rate have been
derived in [7] with a multiple-antenna AF relay considering
three different secure transmission schemes.
Despite the fact that in many wireless applications, the
nodes are energy-constrained and have limited battery-life,
most of the works including the papers mentioned above
assumed that the nodes which generate jamming signals either
are equipped with batteries of infinite capacities or these
jammers are connected to a fixed power supply. To this
end, wireless energy harvesting through radio frequency (RF)
signals has emanated as a promising solution which facili-
tates to provide uninterruptible and controlled power to the
energy-constrained jammers [9], [10] and references therein.
In contrast to the existing works, we propose a new secure
beamforming scheme with multiple antennas at the source and
a wireless powered jammer for an AF relay network.
In particular, our main contributions are: (i) We present a
new closed-form solution for the beamforming vector which
maximizes the instantaneous secrecy capacity. This closed-
form solution provides direct insights into the impact of vari-
ous system parameters on the proposed beamforming scheme.
Moreover, as our proposed secure beamforming scheme is a
linear combination of energy beamforming (EB) and informa-
tion beamforming (IB), it achieves a higher ergodic secrecy
rate (ESR) when compared to the relatively straightforward
EB and IB schemes; (ii) We provide a new closed-form
approximation for the ESR with a given beamforming vector
and it is shown that the approximation is tight for large
number of antennas at the source. Therefore, the closed-form
approximation evaluates the ESR efficiently without resorting
to time-consuming simulations.
Notations: ||x|| and x† denote the Euclidean norm and
conjugate-transpose of vector x, respectively. The norm of a
complex number z is denoted by |z|. Moreover E(·) denotes
expectation operator. [y]+ , max (y, 0) and fX (x) represents
probability density function. Ei(·), E1(·) are exponential
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2integral functions, ln{·} is natural logarithmic function and
Gm,np,q [·] is Meijer-G function [11].
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND SIGNAL-TO-NOISE RATIO
We consider a five-node network which comprises of a
source (S), a trusted variable-gain relay (R), an external jam-
mer (J), legitimate destination (D) and an eavesdropper (E).
All nodes are equipped with a single-antenna except S which
has N (N ≥ 1) antennas. Moreover, all nodes have access to
fixed power supplies except J which harvests energy using
RF signals originating from S. Furthermore, it is assumed that
both R and J operate in half-duplex mode with AF relaying
protocol is adopted at R. Moreover, as in [12] we consider that
the AN from J is either nulled out at D through cooperation
or it does not reach to D due to an obstacle between J and
D. Similarly, the direct link between S and D (and E) does
not exist due to poor channel conditions. We consider block
fading channels i.e., all channels remain constant for a block
time T and then change independently. The communication
takes place using two phases each of length T/2.
During phase 1, the signals received at J (yJ) and R (yR)
are, respectively, given as follows
yJ =
√
PsLc
dαSJ
h†SJwxS + nJ , (1)
yR =
√
PsLc
dαSR
h†SRwxS + nR, (2)
where xS is an information signal transmitted from S with
E
{|xS |2} = 1 and Ps is the transmit power of S. Moreover,
w is N × 1 unit-norm beamforming vector. dij denotes the
distance between the i-th and j-th node where i, j ∈ (S, R, J,
D and E). Lc and α represent path-loss constant and a path-
loss exponent, respectively. Furthermore, hSJ and hSR are
N ×1 channel vectors for the S to J and S to R links, respec-
tively with mutually independent complex entries following
complex circularly symmetric Gaussian (CSG) distributions of
zero mean and unit variance. Moreover, ni denotes the additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at i-th node following complex
CSG distribution with zero mean and variance σ2n .
During phase 2, the signal transmitted by J is xJ =
√
PJv,
where PJ is the transmit power of J and v is a unit-power
AN signal. Using (1) and assuming that the noise power is
negligible for energy harvesting purposes, we can write
xJ =
√
ηPsLcd
−α
SJ |h†SJw|v, (3)
where η ∈ [0, 1] represents an energy conversion efficiency.
Moreover, the signal transmitted by R is xR = βyR, where
β is an amplification gain factor which satisfies E
{|xR|2} =
PR. Therefore, we can write
β2 =
PR
PSLcd
−α
SR|h†SRw|2 + σ2n
, (4)
where PR denotes the transmit power of R. The signals
received at D (yD) and E (yE) are , respectively, given as
yD = β
√
PsL
2
c
(dSRdRD)
α
(
h†SRw
)
hRDxS +
βhRDnR√
LcdαRD
+ nD,
(5)
yE = β
√
PsL
2
c
(dSRdRE)
α
(
h†SRw
)
hRExS +
βhREnR√
LcdαRE
+
√
ηPsL
2
c
(dSJdJE)
α |h†SJw|hJEv + nE , (6)
where hRD, hJE and hRE denote the channel coefficients
for the R to D, J to E and R to E links, respectively, each
following complex CSG distribution with zero mean and unit
variance. Substituting (4) into (5) and (6) and doing some
manipulations, the instantaneous signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs)
at D (γD) and E (γE) are, respectively, given as
γD =
γSRγRD
γSR + γRD + 1
< γubD =
γSRγRD
γSR + γRD
, (7)
γE =
γSRγRE
γRE + (γSR + 1) (γJE + 1)
, (8)
where the superscript ‘ub’ stands for upper-bound, γSR ,
K1|h†SRw|2, γRD , K2XRD, γJE , K3|h†SJw|2XJE ,
γRE , K4XRE , XRD , |hRD|2, XJE , |hJE |2and
XRE , |hRE |2. Furthermore, K1 ,
(
PSLcd
−α
SR
)
/σ2n, K2 ,(
PRLcd
−α
RD
)
/σ2n, K3 ,
(
ηPSL
2
cdSJdJE
)−α
/σ2n and K4 ,(
PRLcd
−α
RE
)
/σ2n. The exact instantaneous secrecy capacity
(C) is given as
C =
1
2
[CD − CE ]+, (9)
where CD , log2 (1 + γD) , CE , log2 (1 + γE) and the
factor of 1/2 is due to the fact that both R and J operate in
half-duplex mode.
III. SECRECY ANALYSIS
A. Secure Beamforming
In this subsection, we present a new secure beamforming
scheme and derive a closed-form solution for the near optimal
beamforming vector assuming a large number of antennas at S.
To this end, we formulate the following optimization problem
P0 : arg max
w
C s.t. ||w||2 = 1. (10)
The problem P0 is non-convex, hence a time-consuming N -
dimensional search is required. Motivated by this, in the fol-
lowing we provide a new closed-form solution of (10) which
renders not only an efficient evaluation for the near optimal
beamforming vector (i.e., that maximizes an approximation of
the objective function) but also provides a way to characterize
a closed-form approximation of the ergodic secrecy rate (as
depicted in subsection 3B).
Proposition 1. In the asymptotic large antenna regime, i.e.,
as N →∞, the near optimal solution (wo) for problem given
in (10) is a linear combination of EB and IB vectors and is
given as
wo = twI +
√
1− t2wE , (11)
where wI and wE represent the IB and EB vec-
tors, respectively, i.e., wI , hSR/||hSR||, wE ,
hSJ/||hSJ ||, t ,
√(
−1 +
√
1 +B0
)
/B0 and B0 ,
N (K1 (γRE/γRD)−K3XJE) / (K3NXJE + γRE).
3Proof: See Appendix A.
It is worth pointing out here that Proposition 1 provides
some interesting insights, e.g., when B0 → −1, wo → wI and
wo → wE for B0 →∞. Similarly when B0 → 0, t→ 1/
√
2
which implies that S achieves a perfect balance between the
IB and EB.
B. Ergodic Secrecy Rate
From [7] and using (9), E (C) provides the ergodic secrecy
capacity, however an exact closed-form expression for E (C)
appears to be intractable. Nevertheless, we use the following
tight lower bound which is known as ESR (C¯) [7]
E (C) ≥ C¯ = 1
2
[E (CD)− E (CE)]+ . (12)
As it clear that the problem of finding a closed-form for (12)
has been reduced obtaining the closed-form expressions for the
E (CD) and E (CE). However, it is still challenging to find the
closed-form expressions due to the intricate expressions given
in (7) and (8). We present these closed-form expressions in
the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In the asymptotic large antenna regime, i.e.,
as N → ∞ and for given value of ‘t’ the tight closed-form
approximations for E (CD) and E (CE) are given in (22) and
(25), respectively.
Proof: See Appendix B.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES AND SIMULATIONS
In this section, we provide numerical examples with η = 0.8
and LC = 0.1. The remaining system parameters are given
in the captions of each figure. To begin with, we investigate
the impact of beamforming vector, w, on the instantaneous
secrecy capacity in Fig. 1. It is shown in Fig. 1 that when
the channel condition of R to E link is better than that of
the R to D link, S tends to beamform more energy towards
J as compared to beamform information signal towards R to
confound E. It is interesting to see that the role of AN at
J is very important even when R to D link is better than
the R to E link except in the extreme case when the channel
amplitude of R to E link approaches zero. In this case, S tends
to beamform towards R instead of J. Moreover, we notice that
the secrecy capacity varies significantly with ‘t’ and its optimal
value is quite close to that obtained through Proposition 1.
Furthermore, we investigate the impact of transmission powers
(PS and PR) on t in Fig. 2. We observe that t increases with
PR, approaching beams of equal strength (i.e., t→ 1/
√
2) and
it decreases with PS . This observation is also in agreement
with Proposition 1, thus verifies (11).
In Fig. 3, the ergodic secrecy capacity is plotted using
Monte Carlo simulations corresponding to (9) upon averaging
over 105 channel realizations. It is clear from Fig. 3 that our
derived approximation in Proposition 2 is tight with these
simulations for various values of the transmission powers
and ‘t’. Moreover, Fig. 3 also shows that our proposed
beamforming scheme achieves a higher ESR as compared to
the ‘no-jammer’ case as well as the trivial EB and IB schemes.
It is worth pointing out here that global knowledge of perfect
Fig. 1. Plot of instantaneous secrecy capacity using (9) for various values of
t. dSR = dSJ = dRD = dRE = dJE = 100m, α = 3, PS = PR = 30
dBm, σ2n = −110 dBm and N = 200. XJE = 1, hSR and hSJ are
generated in MATLAB in same sequence with rng (10).
Fig. 2. Plot of instantaneous secrecy capacity using (9) for various values
of PR and PS . dSR = dSJ = dRD = 20m, dRE = 30m, dJE = 10m,
α = 3, σ2n = −80 dBm and N = 500. XRE = XRD = 1, XJE = 0.82,
hSR and hSJ are generated in MATLAB in same sequence with rng (100).
instantaneous channel state information (CSI) including that of
the wiretap links (as considered in [13]) is required to calculate
‘t’ in both Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. However in Fig. 3, we took
t = 0.35 by replacing random variables (RVs) in B0 by their
respective averages, thus the value of ‘t’ remains fixed for all
channel realizations (therefore only statistical knowledge of
CSI for R to E and R to D links is required). Interestingly,
even for a fixed ‘t’, the ESR is almost equal to the case in
which ‘t’ is selected optimally for each channel realization.
4Fig. 3. Plot of ergodic secrecy capacity through simulations and ESR using
(12) for various values of PR and PS . dSR = dSJ = 50m, dRD =
30m, dRE = 60m, dJE = 40m, α = 2.7, σ2n = −80 dBm and N = 300.
V. CONCLUSION
In this correspondence, we proposed a secure beamform-
ing scheme which is shown to achieve a higher ergodic
secrecy rate compared to the trivial information and energy
beamforming schemes. Moreover, we present a new closed-
form solution for the proposed beamforming vector which
maximizes the ergodic secrecy capacity. We also derived a new
closed-form approximation for the ergodic secrecy rate with a
given beamforming vector. We observed that, in general, the
source tends to transmit a stronger beam towards the wireless
powered jammer as compared to the relay to maximize the
ergodic secrecy rate except for the scenario in which the relay
to eavesdropper channel is extremely weak.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Although the objective function of (10) is considerably
different from that given in [14], w admits the same generic
form1 and for N →∞, we can have
w = twI +
√
1− t2wE , (13)
where t ∈ [0, 1]. Substituting (13) into the upper bound of
(7) we can write
γD w γ˜D (t) =
γ˜SR (t) γRD
γ˜SR (t) + γRD
, (14)
where leveraging law of large numbers we put ||hSR||2 w
N and can write γ˜SR (t) , K1
[
Nt2 +
(
1− t2)ZSR] with
ZSR , |h†SRwE|2 is an exponential RV of unit mean [14].
Using a similar approach as adopted in [15], (8) can be upper-
bounded as
1It is worth mentioning here that only the generic form of w remains same,
our final solution is different from that of [14] due to significant difference
in the objective functions.
γE < min
(
γSR,
γRE
γJE
)
. (15)
Now substitute (13) into (15) and using again ||hSJ ||2 w N ,
we can write
γE w γ˜E (t) = min
(
γ˜SR (t) ,
γRE
γ˜JE (t)
)
, (16)
where γ˜JE (t) , K3
[
N
(
1− t2)+ t2ZSJ]XJE and ZSJ ,
|h†SJwI|2 is an exponential RV of unit mean. Now with
γ˜D (t) 1, the approximation of (9) can be written as
C˜ (t) =
1
2
[log2 (γ˜D (t))− log2 (1 + γ˜E (t))]+. (17)
Furthermore, using (17) and after some manipulation, we can
reformulate the problem P0 as
P1 : t = arg min
t
[min (g1 (t) , g2 (t))] , s.t. 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, (18)
where g1 (t) ,
1 + γ˜SR (t)
γ˜D (t)
and g2 (t) ,
1
γ˜D (t)
[
1 +
γRE
γ˜JE (t)
]
. It is interesting to note that for
g1 (t) ≤ g2 (t) , we have γ˜D (t) ≤ γ˜E (t) and C˜ (t) is always
equal to zero ∀t. Therefore, problem P1 can be simplified as
P2 : t = arg min
t
g2 (t) , s.t. 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. (19)
Now take first derivative of the objective function given in
(19) with respect to ‘t’, (note that ZSR and ZSJ related terms
in γ˜SR (t) and γ˜JE (t) can be ignored as N →∞), substitute
t2 = y and after some manipulation, we get
B0y
2 + 2y − 1 = 0, (20)
B0 , N (K1 (γRE/γRD)−K3XJE) / (K3NXJE + γRE)
with B0 ∈ [−1,∞) . Using the quadratic formula, we get the
following two roots for (20)
y1 =
−1−√1 +B0
B0
and y2 =
−1 +√1 +B0
B0
. (21)
Note that y1 ≥ 1 for −1 ≤ B0 < 0 and y1 < 0 for B0 > 0.
Moreover for B0 ≥ −1, we have 0 ≤ y2 ≤ 1, therefore we
get unique minima for P2 at t =
√
y2 .
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Derivation of E (CD):
By adopting approach as in [16], using (7) and γ˜SR (t) from
Appendix A, we can write (22). Given the fact that for any
RV X, E (ln {1 +X}) =
ˆ ∞
0
ln {1 + x} fX (x) dx, therefore
using eq. (2.5.2.1) of [11], the identity −Ei (−x) = E1 (x)
and after some manipulation, we get (23) and (24)
In case for λD = µD, using eq. (2.5.2.11) of [11] we can
replace (24) with
CD3 = G
1,3
3,2
[
µD
∣∣∣∣ −1, 1, 11, 0
]
. (28)
Now placing (23) and (24) or (28) into (22), we get the desired
result.
5E (CD) w
1
ln (2)
E (ln {1 + µDZSR})︸ ︷︷ ︸
CD1
+E (ln {1 +K2XRD})︸ ︷︷ ︸
CD2
−E (ln {(1 + µDZSR + λDXRD)})︸ ︷︷ ︸
CD3
 , (22)
where µD ,
K1
(
1− t2)
1 +K1Nt2
and λD ,
K2
1 +K1Nt2
. Moreover,
CD1= exp
(
1
µD
)
E1
(
1
µD
)
and CD2 = exp
(
1
K2
)
E1
(
1
K2
)
. (23)
CD3 =
1
λD − µD
[
λD exp
(
1
λD
)
E1
(
1
λD
)
− µD exp
(
1
µD
)
E1
(
1
µD
)]
for λD 6= µD. (24)
E (CE) w
1
ln (2)
E (ln {1 +K4XRE + µEXJE})︸ ︷︷ ︸
CE1
−E (ln {(1 + µEXJE + λEXRE)})︸ ︷︷ ︸
CE2
 , (25)
where µE , K3
[
N
(
1− t2)+ t2] and λE , K4
1 +K1 [Nt2 + (1− t2)] . Moreover,
CE1 =
1
µE −K4
[
µE exp
(
1
µE
)
E1
(
1
µE
)
−K4 exp
(
1
K4
)
E1
(
1
K4
)]
for K4 6= µE . (26)
CE2 =
1
λE − µE
[
λE exp
(
1
λE
)
E1
(
1
λE
)
− µE exp
(
1
µE
)
E1
(
1
µE
)]
for λE 6= µE . (27)
Derivation of E (CE):
Again adopting the approach of [16] and after few ma-
nipulation, we can write (25). The closed-form expression
for (25) appears to be intractable, thus we replaced RVs
ZSR = ZSJ with their respective means (which are unity).
As the remaining derivation for E (CE) is similar to that of
E (CD), for sake of brevity we skipped the steps. Furthermore,
for K4 = µE or λE = µE , we can replace (26) or (27)
accordingly with
CE1 (or CE2) = G
1,3
3,2
[
µE
∣∣∣∣ −1, 1, 11, 0
]
. (29)
Now the evaluation for E (CE) can be done using (25).
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